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SEARCHES, SEIZURES, CONFESSIONS, AND SOME
THOUGHTS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: REGULATION
OF POLICE INVESTIGATION—LEGAL, HISTORICAL,
EMPIRICAL, AND COMPARATIVE MATERIALS
DANIEL YEAGER*
Criminal procedure casebooks densely populate the market but
rarely are reviewed.1 This may be because they are all the same (which
makes them unremarkable), or because of the unalterable dominance of
Kamisar, LaFave, and Israel’s Modern Criminal Procedure2 (which
makes them irrelevant). In Criminal Procedure: Regulation of Police In-
vestigation—Legal, Historical, Empirical, and Comparative Materials ,3
Christopher Slobogin copes with the anxiety of influence by writing a dif-
ferent sort of text. In 564 pages dedicated in large part to the usual top-
ics,4 Slobogin offers only twenty edited Supreme Court opinions, although
he does compress the facts of 120 others into problems. Throughout the
text, he emphasizes alternative methods of regulation and, as an accom-
plished empiricist,5 repeatedly gives us data that supplements abstract ac-
counts of the culture and practices of police. Comparative law also gets
attention, though somewhat unevenly—perhaps due to the highly factual-
ized rules of American constitutional law, which have no counterpart in
other legal systems.
The publisher, The Michie Company, is earning a reputation as a
publisher of avant garde law books,6 but Michie has yet to design books
so elegantly as the three primary presses (Foundation, Little Brown, and
West). For example, the index lists cases but not secondary sources, and
                                                                                                         
* Associate Professor, California Western School of Law.  A.B., 1979, Kenyon Col-
lege; J.D., 1989, University of Florida; LL.M., 1991, University of Illinois.
1. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Essay, Exorcising Langdell’s Ghost: Structuring a Criminal
Procedure Casebook for How Lawyers Really Think , 43 HASTINGS L.J. 143 (1991) (reviewing
WELSH S. WHITE & JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF (1990)); Robert Batey, Book Review, 48
TENN. L. REV. 805 (1981) (reviewing JOSEPH G. COOK & PAUL MARCUS, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (1981)).
2. YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (8th ed. 1994).
3. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: REGULATION OF POLICE IN-
VESTIGATION—LEGAL, HISTORICAL, EMPIRICAL, AND COMPARATIVE MATERIALS (The
Michie Company 1993).
4. Those are searches and seizures (223 pp.), interrogation (95 pp.), identification pro-
cedures (35 pp.), entrapment and undercover practices (26 pp.), and remedies (81 pp.).
5. See, e.g., Norman Finkel & Christopher Slobogin, Insanity, Justification, and Cu l-
pability: Toward a Unifying Schema , 19  LAW & HUM. BEH. 447 (1995); Christopher Slobogin
et al., The Feasibility of a Brief Evaluation of Mental State at the Time of the Offense , 8 LAW
& HUM. BEH. 305 (1984).
6. See STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION (1995); ROBERT E.
SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY (2d ed. 1993).
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it punishes readers for reversing case captions. And, at times, where court
opinions end and commentary begins is indecipherable.7 Simply put, the
book is outwardly somewhat homely. Aesthetics aside, the book is mostly
excellent and astonishingly so for a first edition. As the subtitle promises,
the book has something for everyone: historians, empiricists, comparativ-
ists, theoreticians, case-crunchers, and practitioners. This review essay
tracks the book’s crowning achievement—the refreshing and inventive
“perspectives” chapter that opens the book. The essay then reflects on the
few aspects of the chapters on search and seizure, confessions, and
remedies that I believe are slightly flawed or incomplete.
I.   PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATING THE POLICE
Slobogin’s book begins with a hefty sermon on the police culture,
which the more law-heavy texts tend to ignore. He depicts a jarringly un-
dereducated police force whose intelligence (I.Q.’s as low as 70) and
character (disobedience, criminal activity) are “frightening” (8-10). It is a
culture where biased hiring practices are rampant (10-13); where acade-
mies are “dangerously inadequate” (15) and formal, in-service training is
“a joke”; and where as little as two percent of training is dedicated to
constitutional law, which is mostly rejected by the recruits (17-18). It is a
police force that usually arrives late to the crime scene, which sometimes
is no scene at all. When they are not misbehaving, officers respond
mostly to trivial offenses and low-level squabbles. As for detectives, Slo-
bogin takes away their television glamour by calling most of their cases
“easy” investigations of “known” perpetrators (18-24).
Police stick together, Slobogin goes on to say, not so much because of
their shared fear of danger but their shared distrust of “fickle” civilians
(25). Evidently “street wise” cops outnumber “management” cops.
Street-wise cops are fraternal, tough, cynical, corner-cutting, self-styled
“craftsmen” who throw their weight around. Management cops are inno-
vative, rational, rule-oriented, and legalistic and, as such, are more re-
ceptive to progressive methods of policing (25-26). Naturally, crime-
control values trump criminal-coddling—even, I gather, if that means
ghastly win-loss records at suppression hearings (26-27).
When police are needlessly violent, we are told it is a combination of
their poor social skills, their desire to be shown respect, and flexible pro-
cedural rules that are to blame (28-30). Police prefer firmness to courtesy
and consistently understate what it means to suspects to save face in front
of witnesses who may be suspects’ family members. Suspects are more
likely to take a beating if they are agitated or drunk, just as they are if
they encounter police in front of other civilians or police. Mamet-esque
                                                                                                         
7. SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 445.
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tough-talk, telling lies, and abuses of discretion directed toward blacks are
regular modes of police behavior (30-35).
What are we to make of all this? That for Slobogin, who offers almost
no counter examples, American policing is highly unprofessional. Even if
policing were a lofty art, no one suggests we leave our guardians unregu-
lated. To unify his discussion of regulating police, Slobogin looks to Ten-
nessee v. Garner8 (where the United States Supreme Court decided when
police may shoot fleeing felons), which he weaves through his survey of
judicial, legislative, and administrative rulemaking. With Garner in mind,
Slobogin first considers whether the Supreme Court should meddle in the
business of local law enforcement (44-54). He explains how much-needed
uniformity, centralization, and accountability in federal, state, and local
law enforcement, coupled with some localities’ persistent mistreatment of
blacks, led to the Court’s governance of police. Something had to be
done; if not by the Supreme Court, then by whom?
States, Slobogin observes, are free to develop their own procedural
mechanisms to enforce their criminal laws.9 He relies on one of his arti-
cles that delineates four evolutionary stages of state constitutionalism: 1)
pre-incorporation dual federalism, where states did whatever they wanted,
short of conscience-shocking transgressions of fundamental fairness; 2)
co-option of states’ autonomy by the later Warren Court’s revolution of
criminal processes; 3) a new federalism by which states counterrevolted
against the Burger Court’s counterrevolution against the Warren Court’s
revolution; and 4) linkage or lockstep, yet another counterrevolution by
state judges and legislatures who wanted no more than minimal protec-
tions for suspects.10 Slobogin offers three arguments against new federal-
ism, which left me uncertain as to his position (57-58). Having read his
excerpted article, I happen to know he endorses a strain of new federal-
ism.11
Although he leaves state constitutionalism in the air, Slobogin ex-
presses his skepticism about a Supreme Court-dominated world of police
practices. The Court is too remote, its rules too naive, and certiorari too
infrequent to have much influence on police practices and state court pro-
ceedings (59-61). Plus, the Court is hampered by gray areas, majority
opinions that carry the signatures of nonbelievers, the fetters of prece-
dent, and a case-and-controversy limitation (62-64).
Consequently, when the Court must speak, Slobogin says, it should
articulate bright-line rules that can be applied on the street, not compli-
                                                                                                         
8. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
9. SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 55-8.
10. Christopher Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law: Exploring the Limits of Flo r-
ida’s “Forced Linkage” Amendment , 39 FLA. L. REV. 653, 658-66 (1987).
11. Id. at 674-82, 685 (advocating a regime of “presumptive linkage” as modified by a
“cautious version” of new federalism).
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cated, multifactored tests that smell of the lamp. If the Court is better
suited to reviewing laws than to making them, Slobogin continues, then
legislatures or police themselves should be the origin of procedural laws
(66-74). Indeed, citizens would be relieved to know that police want to
constrain themselves formally, although Slobogin is lukewarm toward
community participation in the development and enforcement of those
constraints (74-75, 511-13). If police govern themselves under more than
a crude oral tradition, then formalized, internal rulemaking would im-
prove their morale, professionalism, obedience, and probably the wisdom
of the rules themselves (70-73). This is not to say that Supreme Court su-
pervision is entirely replaceable by internal regulation, legislation, or
state constitutionalism. All three alternative sources of regulation tend to
sink protections to the Court’s established minimums. Nonetheless, this
section of Slobogin’s text reflects his belief that the Court should play a
backup role reviewing police policy, not originating it.
Slobogin then turns from who should regulate the police to the organiz-
ing principles for an ideal procedural regime. He systematically presents
three models of procedure, each in theory and then in practice.
Slobogin presents Herbert Packer’s familiar crime-control and due-
process models as opposing conceptions of an adversarial model. Then he
juxtaposes that model against a Continental and nonadversarial, or inquisi-
torial, model (76-80, 85-93). Slobogin then presents a third, and less
familiar model, John Griffiths’s naive “family model.”  Griffiths de-
scribes the adversarial “battle” as a reconciliation among loved ones (94-
96). He asks us to see the criminal not as a deviant or outsider but as one
of our own who has lost his way in a momentary lapse of restraint. To so
view the criminal demands that we presuppose the fairness of public offi-
cials. Because Griffiths recognizes that nothing could be more un-
American, our resistance to his model must be, to him, itself peculiarly
American.
Slobogin uses David Bayley’s excerpt to consider the practical conse-
quences of the family model. Bayley begins with the dubious assumption
that people refrain from committing crimes because they have fully inte-
grated cultural norms into their belief systems, not because they are afraid
of getting caught. However, before Bayley asks us to accept his view of
law-abidingness, he limits his view to “tightly knit primary groups,” such
as those found in Japan and China. In those groups, informal responses to
deviance are the norm, and formal criminal processes are reserved for the
incorrigible whom the family, community, and schools cannot reform
(96-97). A successful family model therefore presupposes stable families,
few people living alone, little mobility, great loyalty to employers, and
intense pressures from family, school, colleagues, and neighbors. This,
Bayley confesses, is hardly the world in which Americans live (97-98).
Yet Bayley goes on to imply that America could improve the character of
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its public actors by leaving them alone—by relying on their internal
(moral) restraint rather than on our external (legal) constraint. But is not
our becoming tightly knit a necessary condition to our yielding to infor-
mal pressures? Bayley’s tail-chasing solution is to improve the character
of public actors in a disconnected, atomistic culture by pretending we are
something we are not.
Slobogin’s careful attention to family, nonadversarial, and crime-
control regimes is not meant to increase our faith in the integrity of ex-
ecutive officials. Instead, he means to demonstrate that adversariness and
its advantage-balancing orientation is symptomatic of nations that are, or
should be, suspicious of authority.
II.   SEARCHES, SEIZURES, CONFESSIONS, AND REMEDIES
A.   Searches and Seizures
Slobogin introduces the chapters on constitutional constraints on police
practices with the Fourth Amendment (99). Throughout the text he em-
bellishes cases and commentary with clear and methodical doses of horn-
book law.12 Thankfully, he dispenses with needless, numerous, and
lengthy reproductions of the Court’s warrant cases. In their place is an
empirical study covering seven cities and canvassing how warrant appli-
cations there are prepared, screened, presented to magistrates, granted,
executed, returned, and challenged.13 The study validates three chronic
suspicions of indigents, minorities, liberals, and academics: 1) warrant
affidavits are plagued by an inverse relationship between the apparent re-
liability of a source and the officer’s reliance on that source; 2) magis-
trates are rubberstamps for police; and 3) the criminal rarely goes free
because the constable blunders.
After exploring some nuances of the warrant process, Slobogin takes
up the so-called “pretext doctrine” (152-62). Pretextual police action oc-
curs when police do the right thing for the wrong reasons. Slobogin cor-
rectly addresses this doctrine early in the text, but he drops it too soon
and after too little explanation. A thicker explanation would note, for ex-
ample, that the Court has held that a search of an arrestee follows auto-
matically from a lawful arrest.14 This bright-line rule is meant to prevent the
destruction of evidence and to protect the arresting officer from weapons
within the arrestee’s reach. But what happens if an officer arrests and
                                                                                                         
12. In a rare lapse, Slobogin departs from the sequence set forth in his four-step
“Structure of Fourth Amendment Analysis,” which states that the first step is an inquiry into
whether the Fourth Amendment is implicated but then begins with the components of a valid
warrant. SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 102-04.
13. Id. at 105-13.
14. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
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searches someone who has violated a law against, say, public drunken-
ness, when the officer’s sole purpose is to look for obscene materials in
the arrestee’s satchel?
Defense attorneys, aided by the reasoning of Professor Burkoff,15
plausibly insist that obscene materials or other evidence of crime found on
the arrestee or in the satchel should be suppressed on the grounds of
“pretext,” “sham,” or “bad faith” (158). The suppression hearing, their
argument runs, should demand from the arresting officer an account of
his motives or reasons for his actions. The trial judge, in turn, should de-
cide whether the officer did the right thing (arrest a lawbreaker) for the
wrong reason (to search the arrestee, not to enforce the drunk-in-public
law).
Slobogin relegates to a single sentence the most sensible and sophisti-
cated thinking on pretexts—that of Professor Haddad.16 Haddad makes the
officer’s motives irrelevant to an assessment of the propriety of the offi-
cer’s actions. The officer’s intent, on the other hand, matters a great deal.
If the officer demonstrates an intent to search the suspect but not to arrest
him, then, according to Haddad, the officer has committed an unlawful
search, not a pretextual search incident to arrest. A search incident to ar-
rest requires that the officer first demonstrate the intent to arrest—to take
the suspect into custody. If the officer demonstrates that intent, then we
should forget about why and uphold the arrest and the subsequent search.
While motives or reasons for human action typically are mysterious,
intentions are not—they are wrapped up in the actions themselves.17 For
instance, Haddad believes that if an officer searches a house under
authority of a defective search warrant and claims later that his intent in
entering was to make a warrantless emergency arrest, then any evidence
obtained in the residence or on the arrestee’s person should be excluded.18
The officer’s lack of intent to execute a warrantless emergency arrest is
demonstrated by the fact that the officer applied for a search warrant,
took it to the residence, produced it before entering, and searched the
house after locating the suspect. Again, this is not a case of a pretextual,
warrantless entry to arrest—it is an unlawful warrantless entry to search.
Yet, to require only that the officer have the intent to rely on the doc-
trine in question may not sufficiently protect against pretexts. Haddad
suggests that when a doctrine is intolerably susceptible to abuse, the doc-
trine should be fashioned to defend against that susceptibility.19 The Su-
                                                                                                         
15. SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 158 (citing John M. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 70, 72-84 (1982)).
16. Id. at 158 (citing James B. Haddad, Pretextual Fourth Amendment Activity: Another
Viewpoint, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 639 (1985)).
17. See Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed
Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law , 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 70-88 (1991).
18. Haddad, supra note 16, at 655-57.
19. Id. at 651-53.
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preme Court recognized as much in Chimel v. California20 by putting a
stop to searches of residences incident to the arrests of occupants (265).
Before Chimel, officers were converting at-home arrests into exploratory
searches of residences without seeking or obtaining a search warrant. Un-
happy with the hazards posed by that doctrine, the Court limited the
permissible scope of a search incident to arrest to the arrestee and the area
within his immediate reach.
Far more often than not, the availability of that type of doctrinal move
for keeping pretexts at bay escapes the Court and its observers.21 Slobo-
gin’s brief overview of pretexts follows Horton v. California.22 Horton
arguably subjects the plain-view doctrine to pretext by permitting officers
to execute a search warrant and seize evidence they fully expected to find
but failed to name in their warrant affidavit (154). Horton may be a clear
and high example of the pretext problem, but that case begins and ends
what should have been pressed throughout the book. For example, Slo-
bogin gives us Washington v. Chrisman,23 where an officer entered his ar-
restee’s dorm room and seized evidence of drug use. Although the officer
claimed the right to stay at the arrestee’s elbow, he abandoned that posi-
tion only to rejoin it after spotting drugs from the hall. Was the entry to
search the room? Does the greater right (to stay at the arrestee’s elbow)
include the lesser (the right not to)? If the greater does include the lesser,
is the potentiality for abuse of the doctrine excessive? These questions are
the office of pretexts and should be so described. So, too, cases such as
Chambers v. Maroney,24 United States v. Robinson,25 Rawlings v. Ken-
tucky,26 Florida v. Wells,27 New York v. Harris,28 and Maryland v. Buie29
show up in Slobogin’s notes and problems. Each case at least nominally
exposes a particular constitutional doctrine to pretext. If we do not like
what police are doing in those cases, then we should ask, as Haddad
would, whether police demonstrated the intent to rely on the doctrine in
question, and if their having done so does not dispel our concerns about
abuse of the doctrine, then we should consider altering the doctrine.
Shortly after the note on pretexts is a section on governmental surveil-
lance of oral communication, which provides pieces of Olmstead v.
                                                                                                         
20. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
21. E.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 (1980) (a search “incident to” ar-
rest may precede the arrest if there is probable cause for the arrest prior to the search; that is,
the search is valid even without the officer’s first demonstrating the intent to arrest).
22. 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
23. 455 U.S. 1 (1982); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 273.
24. 399 U.S. 42 (1970); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 279.
25. 414 U.S. 218 (1973); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 276.
26. 448 U.S. 98 (1980); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 547.
27. 495 U.S. 1 (1990); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 285.
28. 494 U.S. 14 (1990); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 554.
29. 494 U.S. 325 (1990); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 271.
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United States,30 the Federal Communications Act of 1934 (FCA), Nar-
done v. United States,31 Berger v. New York,32 Katz v. United States,33 and
Title III and its amendments (173-76). This is fine, but the relationship
between Congress, the Court, and state enforcers could be clearer, as
could the answer to what seems an inevitable question—why Katz was not
protected by the FCA. To have noted the fact that Katz involved a listen-
ing device that was an “interception” (and proscribed as such by Title III
but not its predecessor, the FCA), but not a “wiretapping,” might have
made this discussion of the law’s growth more complete.
As does a previous section on profiles (law enforcement’s stereotypes
that make suspects out of anyone who shares traits with known criminals),
the section on electronic surveillance peppers us with uninterpreted data
(143-47, 177). Slobogin tells us wiretaps are both expensive and produc-
tive. Yet, he fails to tell us whether a 29% conviction rate is good
enough; whether 107 people are too many to be intercepted by a single
intercept order; and whether $57,643 is too much money for the return it
yields. And how accurate should a profile be to recommend its use? If
half of Baltimore’s black males between eighteen and thirty-five are
“under some form of criminal justice restriction,”34 does that mean the
other half is law-abiding? That they are criminals? Or does it tell us
nothing at all about them? The numbers are interesting, but what do they
mean?
Next, Slobogin offers thoughtful, definitive sections on what it means
to “search” and “seize.” To embellish Supreme Court pronouncements on
the grammar of searches, Slobogin reproduces a portion of his published
empirical study.35 In that study, he argued that if a search occurs when
governmental observation invades the movant’s reasonable expectation of
privacy, then deciding whether a search occurs is an empirical question
whose answer should serve as “social authority” (read, “law”) (205-6). In
other words, if the Court is going to reflect rather than dictate our expec-
tations, then we should identify systematically what we expect. With that
insight in mind, Slobogin asked a group—mostly students—to rate the in-
trusiveness of various governmental quests for evidence. While he admits
to picking the subjects in a way that may have excessively tilted the re-
sults, still his study provides a far more accurate reflection of privacy ex-
                                                                                                         
30. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
31. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
32. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
33. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
34. SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 145 (quoting William Raspberry, Rules Different for
Young Blacks, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1992, at A19).
35. SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 201-05 (reproducing Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E.
Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases:
An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,”  42 DUKE L.J.
727 (1993)).
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pectations than the unidentified sources on which the Court relies. Spe-
cific examples which offend the public far more than the Court are the
government’s use of informers and government’s perusal of bank records
(203).
Slobogin is definitely onto something, but surveys are not the only
source of public opinion on our expectations of privacy. The positive law
is the other source I have in mind.
At its inception, I believe, Katz36 was meant to supplement, not sup-
plant, property law; and to the extent that pre-Katz cases such as Jones v.
United States,37 Silverman v. United States,38 Chapman v. United States,39
and Warden v. Hayden40 made any other reading of Katz possible, then
those cases, or those interpreting them, were wrong.41 Katz solved the
narrow problem posed by modes of eavesdropping that the law of trespass
could not adequately regulate. Katz’s solution was that proof of a gov-
ernmental trespass into a constitutionally protected area no longer would
be a necessary condition to Fourth Amendment protection against quests
for evidence.42 Necessary, no; sufficient, yes.43 It follows that the positive
laws not only of property, but of crime, tort, and contract should control
the lion’s share of cases that address when a search occurs, whose interest
it invades, and who may privately authorize such a search.
The Court purports to recognize this when it says that our expectations
of privacy “must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment.”44 That
dictum notwithstanding, the positive law remains relevant, but dilute—
mentioned for unstated reasons and with inconsistency from case to case
and justice to justice.45 Property law’s status, for example, slides awk-
wardly between “weighty” and “principal,”46 and no status at all.47 A
more formal and less erratic acknowledgment of “expressed expectations
of privacy before resorting to unexpressed ones would not only make
                                                                                                         
36. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
37. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
38. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
39. 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
40. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
41. See Daniel B. Yeager, Search, Seizure, and the Positive Law: Expectations of Privacy
Outside the Fourth Amendment , 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 249 (1993).
42. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53.
43. It is not that property rights are “only marginally relevant” to Fourth Amendment
cases, the Court recently explained; rather, as Hayden and Katz recognized that “protection of
privacy” is the “‘principal’ object of the Amendment,” property no longer is “the sole meas-
ure” of protection. But this is not to say, added the Court, that “this shift in emphasis had
snuffed out” the relevance of property law to Fourth Amendment cases. Soldal v. Cook
County, 113 S. Ct. 538, 544-45 (1992).
44. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
45. Yeager, supra note 41, at 253.
46. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 112 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
47. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 n.15 (1984) (“[T]he common law of tres-
pass furthers a range of interests that have nothing to do with privacy . . . .”).
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Fourth Amendment litigation more predictable, but more protective as
well—at least where the positive law identifies an interest that a reviewing
court could otherwise . . . ignore.”48
My point here is not to undermine the value of Slobogin’s survey. In-
deed, I would rather depend on his empirical account of how the public
assesses various intrusions than wait for the Court’s pronouncements,
which have come from out of nowhere (though I admit that the Justices,
no less than those surveyed by Slobogin, are native speakers of English
whose utterances are evidence of what we mean by, and how we use, the
word “privacy”). My point is that the positive law, too, is a source of
hard data about expectations, many of which relate to the right to exclude
others.
When Slobogin turns from defining searches to defining seizures, he
hedges about whether a seizure occurs when the government removes
contraband from a defendant’s possession. He says that the word
“seizure”—which covers a “meaningful interference with an individual’s
possessory interests”49—arguably is inapposite when possession itself is
unlawful.
I disagree. One might argue the inapplicability of the word “seizure”
to contraband, but not very well. Only the most crabbed understanding of
“possession” would hold that the government’s use of contraband to
which it can obtain title is severable from the manner in which that claim
is asserted. A defendant
who obtains suppression but not return of the property has obtained a
remedy despite the government’s superior interest in the property. The
reason the government cannot use the evidence in such a case is that it
went about asserting its interest unlawfully, much as a victim of tres-
pass must pay damages to her intruder if the victim’s manner of ejec-
tion exceeds those legally prescribed. When government acts unlaw-
fully, one incident of rightful possession—admissibility—is lost. There,
the prior wrongful possessor . . . can rely on prior possession to effect
exclusion. So too, when government lawfully searches for and seizes
evidence in the defendant’s possession, it receives the full panoply of
rights that a superior, even if temporary, possessory interest confers,
including admissibility at trial.50
Under any other view, police could, for example, trespass onto a property
owner’s “open field” (à la Oliver v. United States51 or United States v.
Dunn52) and, after seizing plants on a wild, uninformed guess as to their
identity, or after seizing the plants simply because they are unpleasant to
                                                                                                         
48. Yeager, supra note 41, at 251-52.
49. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
50. Yeager, supra note 41, at 275 (citations omitted).
51. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
52. 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
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look at or smell, admit them at the property owner’s trial. That cannot be
the law. The fact that the seized plants turn out to be contraband means
only that the property owner is denied the remedy of replevin.
In the same passage, Slobogin goes on to say that the Court “appears”
to have held or “assumed” otherwise in United States v. Jacobsen,53
where DEA agents destroyed a trace amount of cocaine in a test to de-
termine whether it was cocaine. Despite Slobogin’s ambivalence, the
Court clearly held that the DEA “seized” the cocaine. What is nonsense is
the Court’s explanation of that holding. The powder’s illegitimate charac-
ter did not make the DEA’s action something other than a seizure, given
that the Court called Jacobsen’s right to the cocaine a “protected property
interest.”54 True, the tiny, “unnoticed” quantity of powder destroyed
made the infringement on that interest “de minimis.”55 That was enough
to degrade or trivialize the seizure into scare quotes, but not enough to
crowd out the seizure altogether.56 Accordingly, any evidence taken or
destroyed without a sufficient antecedent justification has been “seized”
(though not necessarily unreasonably), even a tiny amount of contraband.
And nothing in the Fourth Amendment, its plain-view doctrine, or Jacobsen
implies otherwise.
Slobogin ends this passage by telling us that “finding that a ‘seizure’ of
property has occurred is seldom of much use to the defendant” (195).
Empirically, I take this as true, but the fact that none of the cases in
which this issue arises involve seizures unsupported by probable cause or
reasonable suspicion makes no difference to what it means to “seize.”
Certainly the Court’s few cases on seizures of “things” could be clearer.
Not only do those cases fail to instruct on what it means to “possess”
something, but also, as Slobogin points out, the definition they employ is
inadequate to deal with conversations.57 We do not “possess” conversa-
tions; and they may be intercepted without interfering with the speakers’
freedom of movement. Yet, it is because of the inadequacies of the
Court’s opinions that this slippery area of Fourth Amendment law de-
serves more than the single page it gets here from Slobogin.58
Another minor difficulty with Slobogin’s search-and-seizure chapter is
his view on the Terry v. Ohio59 line of cases. In addition to his failure to
offer specific illustrations of what Terry would allow that Professor
Sundby’s theory would not, I wonder whether Slobogin’s decoupling of
the right to seize from the right to search is the soundest approach (232-
                                                                                                         
53. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
54. Id. at 125.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 125 n.28.
57. SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 195 n.10.
58. See also SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 314-21 (more on seizures of property, especially
the law of forfeitures).
59. 392 U.S. 1 (1988).
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33). I lift this from Justice Harlan, who wrote separately in Terry to ex-
press his view that the right to frisk follows automatically from the right
to stop.60 Indeed, the behaviors are so intertwined that often, as it was in
Terry, it is the frisk that alerts us to the fact that a stop has taken place.
These two behaviors converge because we apparently have dispensed with
“field interrogation”61 as a prerequisite to the frisk. To be sure, students
appreciate the nice separation of seizure issues from search issues. But,
just as criminal law texts that approach mens rea by separating intentions
from actions62 use a strategy that is false to what it means to act, so too is
a text that separates stops from frisks false to the context of Terry, which,
despite its explicit narrowness, ultimately authorized police to make two
types of intrusions at once.
Later in his chapter on search and seizure, Slobogin posits that United
States v. Chadwick63 includes the “open question” of whether Chadwick
could have been arrested and his footlocker searched incident to his arrest
(278). I disagree. Were the footlocker unlocked (which it was not) and the
search contemporaneous with the arrest (which it was not), then both the
search and the arrest would be authorized by Chimel,64 so long as Chad-
wick possessed the drug-packed footlocker (which he did). What is an
open question—or what Justice Scalia has urged us to see as one65—is
whether opaque containers can be searched on probable cause without ref-
erence to the power to arrest (281).
My last quibble with Slobogin’s massive search-and-seizure chapter is
the minor role he gives written departmental statements of policy in the
control of police discretion. Understating the importance of a depart-
ment’s having and following its own rules will increase pretextual actions.
Those actions are evident in the context of vehicle searches—the subject
of New York v. Belton,66 California v. Acevedo,67 and Florida v. Wells68
(277, 281, 285). Those cases, among others, give police too much leeway
in their dealings with motorists. Professor LaFave’s oeuvre on administrative
control of discretion could have helped here,69 particularly with Slobo-
gin’s discussions of the impoundment and inventorying of vehicles. It
                                                                                                         
60. Id. at 31-34 (Harlan, J., concurring).
61. See id. at 7, 11, 19 n.16, 34.
62. E.g., SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 171, 204 (6th ed. 1995).
63. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
64. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
65. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580-85 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
66. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
67. 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
68. 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
69. E.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations: The
Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication , 89
MICH. L. REV. 442 (1990).
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would have been instructive to have, for example, a word after Wells on
how cases like Colorado v. Bertine70 and Illinois v. Lafayette71 might have
led to standardized, written departmental regulations becoming a neces-
sary condition of the constitutionality of certain police actions (286).72
B.   Confessions
Slobogin superbly handles confessions, although he and the commenta-
tors he enlists overlook Miranda v. Arizona’s73 only remaining virtue: its
effect on police, not on suspects. As Professor Dripps has argued:
[T]he warnings have contributed generally to a more humane police
culture, and they surely impose some limits on police tactics in specific
cases. The reading of rights affects the questioner, even if it glances off
the suspect. Only a corroded conscience could live with reading the
Miranda card by the glare of the arc lamp. And the law-abiding police
interrogator must tread rather lightly; too much pressure and the sus-
pect may invoke the right to counsel.74
Moreover, none of Slobogin’s commentators adequately opposes the
Court’s obsession with compulsion, which, for reasons that are unclear to
me, is required at every step of analysis in its confessions cases. Those
cases tolerate “subtle compulsion”75 and insist on “compelling influ-
ences”76 and a suspect’s objective experience of “coercion”77 before Mi-
randa’s presumption of compulsion kicks in.78
Professor Stuntz, whom Slobogin quotes, also overplays the impor-
tance of compulsion in his reconciliation of the Court’s corpus of deci-
sions.79 Stuntz endorses police deception of suspects because it poses no con-
fess-or-lie dilemma; that is, deception and trickery are okay because they
do not give suspects the impression that there is no right to silence (378).
Thus a deluded suspect such as Butler, who, as a true American, appar-
ently believed only written agreements are binding, was treated fairly be-
                                                                                                         
70. 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
71. 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
72. See LaFave, supra note 69, at 456-57.
73. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
74. Donald A. Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and Its Conservative Critics: Toward a
Unified Theory of Constitutional Criminal Procedure , 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 591, 632 (1990)
(footnote omitted).
75. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303 (1980).
76. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529 (1987).
77. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990).
78. See Daniel Yeager, Rethinking Custodial Interrogation , 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1,
69-70 (1990).
79. SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 378 (citing William Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal
Proceedings, 75 VA. L. REV. 761 (1989)).
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cause he felt no pressure from police. In other words, for Stuntz, Butler’s
ignorance was liberating, not enslaving.
North Carolina v. Butler80 is a haughty decision, made no less so by
Stuntz’s defense of it. A misinterpreted Miranda warning, “without
more,” does not demonstrate an unpressured encounter, far from it. In
fact, Butler’s botching of the oral-written distinction is more likely a
symptom of custody (which by definition is pressure-filled) than of a tac-
tical move by a swaggering, but misinformed, shlub. Determined to stand
up to the pressures of custody, Butler’s simultaneous refusal to sign a
waiver form and willingness to orally incriminate himself well may sig-
nify a desperate attempt to fend off interrogators. In other words, the
clumsiness of Butler’s strategy undercuts it as a knowing and intelligent
relinquishment of a constitutional right and demonstrates compulsion to
waive more readily than it demonstrates an unconstrained, spontaneous
speech act. The fact that Butler sounds strategic to Stuntz is puzzling
given the conditions under which the “strategy” was constructed.
Furthermore, Stuntz’s reliance on the confess-or-lie dilemma papers
over the fact that police-imposed pressure accounts only partially for Mi-
randa and is not an essential component of Miranda’s operation. Miranda
expresses more than a need to exclude compelled and unreliable confes-
sions. It strikes additionally at the secrecy of police-suspect encounters,
which adversarial systems can re-create in only the motliest fashion.81 And,
while the values served by Miranda are not “necessarily divorced from the
correct ascertainment of guilt”82 (a function that is “nowhere mentioned in
the constitutional text and never articulated in the legislative history”),83 Mi-
randa’s “relationship to accurate fact-finding is indirect and often insub-
stantial.”84
Much more centrally and profoundly, Miranda expresses our belief in
a complex of soft variables—of dignity, privacy, equality, consent, re-
spect, adversariness, and a preference for enlightened investigative tech-
niques that minimize pretrial punishment.85 Pressed into service of this
pastiche of values, the versatile Miranda starred in the 1960s’ “morality
play in which large-scale social forces, having little or nothing to do with
criminal law, were joined in combat.”86 As Slobogin points out in an ex-
                                                                                                         
80. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
81. Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation—And the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination , 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 706 (1988); Welsh S. White,
Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan , 39 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1986).
82. Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1753 (1993).
83. Dripps, supra note 74, at 593.
84. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Const i-
tutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1775 n.233 (1991).
85. Daniel B. Yeager, Categorical and Individualized Rights-Ordering on Federal Habeas
Corpus, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 669, 691 (1994) (citing Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1753).
86. Louis M. Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Contin u-
ity and Change in Criminal Procedure , 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 442 (1980).
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cerpt from Professor Strauss, “Traditional constitutional theory calls for
courts to admit that they are not very good at finding the facts that bear
on large-scale social problems; Miranda made essentially that admission
about facts of a certain category of particular cases” (351). Only by re-
ducing Miranda’s thick meaning to a flat ban on compulsion-in-fact (as
well as by adopting a too-narrow notion of “compulsion”) can we accept
the waivers of folks such as Butler and Burbine,87 the absence of custody
in Berkemer v. McCarty88 and Oregon v. Mathiason,89 the absence of in-
terrogation in Illinois v. Perkins,90 the exceptions of New York v. Quar-
les91 and Oregon v. Elstad,92 and the fruits of the pesky interrogation in
Miller v. Fenton.93
C.   Remedies: Limitations on the Exclusionary Rule
Slobogin’s materials on remedies are conventional and first-rate. He
does a particularly fine job in setting out the operation of damages suits,
although his writing there is uncharacteristically compressed (504-11).
When he turns to the familiar arguments over the exclusionary rule, he
identifies a strong, and to my mind, new basis on which to oppose deter-
rence of police misbehavior as the driving force behind the rule: police
have no idea what they are doing. I doubt that anyone would seriously ar-
gue that as a matter of social policy, a police force with only a slightly
better than random chance of understanding what they are allowed to do
should be exempt from the exclusionary rule. Unfortunately, however,
Slobogin buries that insight in a footnote, depriving it of much of its zip.94
There is one other wrinkle in the fabric of a deterrence-based theory of
exclusion that Slobogin sloughs off. I assume, arguendo, that remedies
here—if not where procedure originates, in the substantive criminal law—
are instruments for deterring would-be wrongdoers rather than for ex-
pressing indignation toward wrongdoers-in-fact. Even so, I see no reason
why exclusion must achieve its stated purpose to justify its existence.
Whether or not one is persuaded that unintentional wrongs are deterrable,
the susceptibility of that proposition to proof is less important than the
aspirations that the exclusionary rule—or the felony-murder rule, the
death penalty, or any sanction for that matter—represents.95 Put another
                                                                                                         
87. SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 393 (referring to defendants in North Carolina v. Butler,
441 U.S. 369 (1979) and Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)).
88. 468 U.S. 420 (1984); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 352.
89. 429 U.S. 492 (1977); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 353.
90. 496 U.S. 292 (1990); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 362.
91. 467 U.S. 649 (1985); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 365.
92. 470 U.S. 298 (1985); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 555.
93. 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 383.
94. SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 498 n.4.
95. See Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of A f-
firmative Duties To Help Strangers , 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 54-57 (1993).
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way, unless exclusion increases police misbehavior (which I am sure it
does not), then the validity of exclusion’s deterrence goal is not necessar-
ily an empirical matter. The exclusionary rule may be defended on purely
moral grounds—for its goals and symbolic value, not for its accomplish-
ments.
The theoretical underpinnings of exclusion behind him, Slobogin’s
treatment of a limit on exclusion—the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doc-
trine—divides the exceptions to exclusion into the three groups the Court
has given us: 1) evidence that was acquired independently of constitu-
tional error; 2) evidence that inevitably would have been obtained despite
constitutional error; and 3) evidence that is too loosely connected to con-
stitutional error to justify its exclusion.
The first of the three—the independent source doctrine—is familiar
from United States v. Wade,96 which ruled on, inter alia, the propriety of
an in-court identification that follows an inadmissible out-of-court identi-
fication. Here it would help were Slobogin to alert us that we are dealing
with a familiar concept, the foundation for which could have been estab-
lished even earlier in his text than Wade; that is, by including in the
chapter on searches, and then alluding to here, Silverthorne Lumber Com-
pany v. United States97 and Goldman v. United States.98
Slobogin’s version of the second limitation on the scope of the exclu-
sionary remedy—the inevitable discovery rule—is incomplete. Without
considering some of the lower court cases (an excellent account of which
appears in Professor LaFave’s treatises)99 or the facts they confront, we
get no feel for how the rule would cope with more problematic cases.
Could Nix v. Williams100 be read to authorize, for example, the gathering
of evidence where officers apply for a warrant, then break down the
search victim’s door before the magistrate makes her decision? Read
woodenly, I suppose it could, but we know (hope?) that is not what the
Court had in mind, unless the gamble itself is seen as a sufficient deter-
rent. Also, an extended use of the word “inevitable” would permit spurious
readings of human behavior, depending on the scope given to hard cases
such as United States v. Ceccolini101 and United States v. Crews,102 to
which Slobogin dedicates too little of his attention.
                                                                                                         
96. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 443.
97. 251 U.S. 385 (1920); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 485, 548.
98. 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (no exclusion of statements overheard when trespass into defen-
dant’s office did not facilitate later, nontrespassory installation of listening device on wall of
adjoining office).
99. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 4 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 11.4(a), at 378-88 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995); WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
JEROLD H. ISRAEL, 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 9.3, at 739-42 (1984 & Supp. 1991).
100. 467 U.S. 431 (1984); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 556.
101. 435 U.S. 268 (1978); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 553.
102. 445 U.S. 463 (1980); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 562.
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As I stated above, the third limitation on the exclusionary rule—the
attenuation exception—allows in evidence acquired in violation of the de-
fendant’s constitutional rights if the connection between the violation and
the discovery of the evidence is weak. As the Court and all other principal
authorities before him have done, Slobogin traces the idea to Nardone v.
United States103 (348).
But, and I crib this from a previously uncited student work, all Nar-
done did was restate the independent-source exception established in Sil-
verthorne.104 The first half of the operative language from Nardone, which
Slobogin quotes, reads:  “Sophisticated argument may prove a causal
connection between information obtained through illicit wire-tapping and
the Government’s proof. As a matter of good sense, however, such con-
nection may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.”105 I rec-
ognize that the dictionary meanings of “attenuated” (“weakened in in-
tensity, force, effect, or value”)106 and “dissipate” (“to destroy or dissolve
completely, undo, annul”)107 describe something other than independence,
which suggests total disconnection. I also admit that the use of the linking
verb “become” in the above-quoted passage furnishes additional proof
that Nardone might have a distinct exception in mind. “Become,” after
all, denotes a passage of time, which is in no way a condition of inde-
pendence.
Unless, that is, these words are being used (however awkwardly) in a
special, rather than ordinary or dictionary, sense. Put another way, in this
context “attenuated,” “dissipate,” and “become” together may be meant
to explain the operation of the independent-source exception and not to
introduce anything new. So understood, an independent source attenuates
or dissipates the taint of a prior constitutional violation; it weakens or an-
nuls an otherwise uninterrupted chain between the violation and the evi-
dence so that the law deems the evidence independent of the violation.108
This plausible, but perhaps confusing, linguistic strategy is more at-
tractive if we do not leave half-said the pertinent passage from Nardone,
which goes on to say: “[T]he trial judge must give opportunity . . . to the
accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a
fruit of the poisonous tree. This leaves ample opportunity to the Govern-
ment to convince the trial court that its proof had an independent ori-
gin.”109 This language appears immediately after what I quoted above. Locat-
                                                                                                         
103. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
104. Brent D. Stratton, Comment, The Attenuation Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: A
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(1984).
105. Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341.
106. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 550 (1970).
107. Id. at 510.
108. Stratton, supra note 104, at 153-54.
109. Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341.
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ing it there undermines any claim that “attenuation” and “independence”
are distinct bases of admissibility, instead of alternative descriptions of
what it means for evidence to be independent of constitutional error.
An attentive reading of the subsequent decisions on point over the next
thirty-five years reveals that none said otherwise, including Wong Sun v.
United States.110 In that case, the Court concluded that admissibility was
not simply a question of but-for causation, but one of “whether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant ob-
jection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or in-
stead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint.”111 “Exploitation” went unexplained, as did how that term changed
or differed from, if at all, the attenuation doctrine suggested in Nardone.
We did learn from Wong Sun that a defendant’s intervening act of free
will yields evidence that is attenuated,112 but it was more than a decade
later, in Brown v. Illinois,113 that the Court first told us just how this
works. And though I am certain that Brown did finally establish a distinct
basis of admissibility for attenuated evidence (evidence is attenuated if
police behave almost constitutionally),114 even there the Court lapsed into
using the attenuation and exploitation formulas interchangeably,115 without
a word on their relation. Whether the doctrine of attenuation got this way
through subversive or simply spurious interpretation is unclear; what is
clear is that the two different meanings given “attenuation” in Brown and
Nardone lack even a remote family resemblance. Thus, contrary to popu-
lar opinion, the distinct, contemporary meaning of “attenuation” origi-
nated somewhere other than in Nardone.
III.   CONCLUSION
Much of what I have described in this review as “slightly flawed or in-
complete” becomes much less so if one reads the text in conjunction with
the teacher’s manual. I have not read it that way because I believe a text
should convince with its own intensity and not by reference to outside
sources, particularly to a manual that is by design kept from its intended
audience (here, students). Solely for the sake of economy, I have spent
more time on the few areas of the text with which I disagree, rather than
on the many with which I do not. Indeed, none of the gripes I have raised
here, alone or together, make Slobogin’s text anything less than first-rate.
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My students agree. In their course evaluations, they uniformly praised
Slobogin for his consistent evenhandedness and “objectivity,” despite my
efforts to convince them that we were entitled to full, unobstructed views
of what he really thinks. Although his 120 problems contain only unem-
bellished conclusions, the students quite handily generated the Justices’
defenses of and attacks on those conclusions. So I suppose it is true that
technical legal knowledge rarely gets us anywhere that knowledge of an-
other kind cannot.116
All of us were improved by this three-credit vacation from the some-
times numbing effect of cases and the routine discussions they tend to in-
spire. We likewise enjoyed together the methodical, hornbook-like intro-
ductions to chapters, sections, and subsections and the unorthodox sources
and intradisciplinary orientation (although there is no philosophy)117 that
distinguish the text. Criminal Procedure: Regulation of Police Investiga-
tion is a serious book by a serious scholar—a true heir apparent—whose
sharp break from law text conventions is as impressive as it is imagina-
tive.
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